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The holding in the instant case can best be understood after a brief
review of the history of fair trade in Ohio. During the depression era one of
the attempts to regain economic stability was based upon the premise that
businesses should be encouraged and preserved by protection from the eco-
nomic depredations of price cutting competition by giant retailers. In 1936,
the Ohio legislature, acting upon this premise, passed a statute popularly
known as the Ohio Fair Trade Act.' In six relatively short sections this act
allowed producers of trade-marked items to enter into contracts establishing
a minimum resale price of such trade-marked or brand-named items. Anyone
who willfully and knowingly failed to maintain these minimum resale prices
was declared to be engaging in unfair competition and unfair trade practices.
The price cutter was liable to anyone damaged by his actions and the price
cutter could be enjoined from continuing the practice. The heart of this act,
the so-called non-signer clause, imposed the same liability and penalties
upon the merchant even if he was not a party to one of the price maintenance
contracts.2
This 1936 Ohio Fair Trade Act remained in force until 1958 when the
Ohio Supreme Court declared the non-signer clause unconstitutional in
Union Carbide and Carbon Corp. v. Bargain Fair, Inc.3 Union Carbide had
sought an injunction to restrain Bargain Fair from selling Prestone Anti-
Freeze below the then existing fair trade price. The court found the section
unconstitutional because it represented an unauthorized exercise of police
power in a matter unrelated to the public safety morals or welfare, delegated
legislative power to private persons, and also denied to the owner of property
the right to sell it on terms of his own choosing.
In 1959, in order to overcome the constitutional objections raised in
Bargain Fair, the legislature passed a new act 4 modeled after the 1958
Virginia Fair Trade Act.5 The new act includes sections, absent in the old
1 Ohio Gen. Code §§ 6402-3-6402.9 (1936) (now Ohio Rev. Code §§ 1333.05-1333.10
(1953)).
2 Ohio Rev. Code § 1333.07 (1953):
Whoever knowingly and willfully advertises, offers for sale, or sells any com-
modity at less than the minimum price stipulated in any contract entered into
under See. 1333.06 Revised Code, whether said person advertising, offering for
sale or selling such commodity is or is not a party to such contract, is engaging
in unfair competition and unfair trade practices and is liable to any person
damaged thereby. (Emphasis added.)
Section 1333.06 referred to above is that which states that contracts between vendors
and vendees setting minimum prices are not in violation of law.
3 167 Ohio St. 182, 147 N.E.2d 481 (1958).
4 Ohio Rev. Code §§ 1333.27-1333.34 (1959).
5 9 Va. Code Ann. §§ 59-8.1 to 59-8.9 (Supp. 1962).
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statute, declaring that'the statute is enacted to promote the public welfare6
and that a proprietor retains an interest in his trade-marked commodity even
after he has sold it.7 Under the old act only the producer of the trade-marked
item could set the minimum price while now the producer may grant this
right to anyone he desires.8 Further, the old act required at least one actual
contract to become operative whereas at present the proprietor may establish
minimum prices by notice or contract. Methods for giving notice of the
establishment of minimum resale prices are elaborately outlined.10 Notice
as such under the old statute was only an implied requirement since one had
to willfully and knowingly sell at less than the established resale price to
violate the act. The crux of the new act, the equivalent of the old non-signer
clause, is to be found in the definition of contract which means "any agree-
ment written or verbal or arising from the acts of the parties." If a person
has notice of the establishment of a minimum resale price of a commodity,
he agrees (and enters into a contract by definition) to maintain that price
by accepting the commodity.1 '
The principal case was the first reported case arising under the new act.
6 Ohio Rev. Code § 1333.27 (1959).
7 Ohio Rev. Code § 1333.31 (1959).
8 Ohio Rev. Code § 1333.28(K) (1959):
Proprietor means:
(1) A person who identifies a commodity produced by him by the use of his
trade-mark or trade name, unless he has specifically granted to another
person sole authority to establish minimums resale prices for such com-
modity;
(2) A person who identifies a commodity distributed by him by the use of his
own trade-mark or trade name;
(3) A person who has been specifically granted by the producer or distributor
of a commodity which is identified by the trade-mark or trade name of
such producer or distributor the sole authority to establish minimum resale
prices for such commodity in the state. (Emphasis added.)
9 Ohio Rev. Code § 1333.29 (1959): "It shall be lawful . . . for a proprietor
to establish and control by notice to distributors, or by contract, stipulated minimum
resale prices . . . ." (Emphasis added.)
10 Ohio Rev. Code § 1333.28(J) (1959):
"Notice" means actual notice given by any method provided in Section 1333.30
of the Revised Code, or otherwise established by legally admissible evidence.
Ohio Rev. Code § 1333.30 (1959):
Actual notice of stipulated minimum resale prices may be given to any person
by mail, through advertising, or through notice attached to merchandise, to
containers, packages or dispensers thereof, or on the invoice therefor, or im-
parted orally . * *
11 Ohio Rev. Code § 1333.28(I) (1959)
. . .Any distributor, (whether he acquires such commodity directly from the
proprietor or otherwise) who, with notice that the proprietor has established
a minimum resale price for a commodity, accepts such a commodity shall
thereby have entered into an agreement with such proprietor not to resell such
commodity at less than the minimum price stipulated therefor by such pro-
prietor.
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Plaintiff corporation, a retail drug dealer and a distributor12 under the act,
brought this action in Cuyahoga County asking a declaratory judgment
that the act, like a portion of its predecessor, is unconstitutional. Plaintiff
stated that it had not and never would enter into any contract or agreement
with defendant proprietor or any other person 13 which would forbid plain-
tiff from selling defendant's products at less than the minimum price stipu-
lated by defendant. Plaintiff admitted receipt of a circular distributed by
defendant announcing that defendant had entered into minimum price con-
tracts with other persons in Ohio, which indicated that defendant had
complied with the notice requirements of the act. Plaintiff claimed that
the act violated its constitutional right to equal protection of the laws and
deprived it of property without due process. Plaintiff further contended the
act is an unconstitutional exercise of the police power in that it bears no
relation to public health, welfare or morals and is an unlawful delegation
of legislative power to private persons. The Cuyahoga County Common
Pleas Court found that regardless of any other changes in the act, the new
act, like the old one, contained an invalid delegation of legislative power and
discretion to private persons and therefore the court declared the new act
unconstitutional. 14
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Judicial District then reversed by
a margin of 2-1 and declared the new act to be constitutional.' 5 This deci-
sion relied heavily upon the reasoning in the Virginia case of Standard Drug
Co. v. General Electric Co.' 6 and the now classical case of Old Dearborn
Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp.17 In Standard Drug the Virginia
Supreme Court found that the new Virginia statute,' 8 used as a model for
the new Ohio statute, was constitutional. Old Dearborn declared that an
Illinois Fair Trade Act,' 9 as applied to intrastrate commerce did not deprive
a price cutting distributor of any rights guaranteed to him by the federal
constitution. The court of appeals did not comment on the characteristic
which distinguishes these cases from the instant case, i.e., the facts in neither
of them brought into question the validity of the non-signer contract pro-
visions of the acts. While it is true that Old Dearborn is cited as upholding
the validity of the entire fair trade act, the record involved a fair trade
contract which was signed by the secretary-treasurer of the price cutting
12 Ohio Rev. Code § 1333.28(E) (1959): "'Distributor' means any person who
acquires a commodity for the purpose of resale."
13 Ohio Rev. Code § 1333.28(F) (1959): "'Person' means an individual, corpora-
tion, partnership, association, joint stock company, business trust, or any unincorporated
organization."
14 Hudson Distrib. Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 1960 CCH Trade Cas. ff 69778 (Ohio C. P.
July 28, 1960.)
15 Hudson Distrib. Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 117 Ohio App. 207, 176 N.E.2d 236 (1961).
14 202 Va. 367, 117 S.E.2d 289 (1960).
17 229 U.S. 183 (1936).
1s Statute cited note 5 supra.
'9 IlL. Ann. Stat. Ch. 121 2, §§ 188-191 (Smith-Hurd 1935).
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defendant.20 In Standard Drug the price cutter dealt with and purchased
directly from the manufacturer. That this fact was given some weight is
illustrated by the following quote from the Virginia court:
The admitted facts established that Standard, the retailer, con-
tracted directly with General Electric, the manufacturer of the
trade-marked flash-bulbs, and when the purchase was made, Stan-
dard, by the express terms of the contract, agreed not to resell at
less than specified minimum prices. It cannot now justly complain
because it is not free to use and impair the good will of General
Electric by selling the bulbs at a price less than it agreed to
maintain.21
In the instant case, the price cutter had signed nothing nor was there any
indication of his dealing directly with the manufacturer.
The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed this decision by a minority of 3-4.
The minority prevailed in this case because of the archaic peculiarity in
the Ohio Constitution which requires the concurrence of all but one member
in order that the supreme court may declare unconstitutional a statute which
has been found constitutional by a court of appeals. 22 The prevailing
minority found the 1959 act cured the constitutional defects of the old act
by introducing two "new" concepts into the area of fair trade law. The
opinion refers to one of these new concepts as the implied contract doctrine.
Under the new act any person23 having notice24 of a minimum price
established by the proprietor 25 who acquires a commodity has entered into
an agreement not to resell at less than that minimum price. This agreement
is said to be a contract, as defined in section 1333.28, which arises from
the acts of the parties. It is difficult to see where these requirements differ
materially from the old act which required that the person willfully and
knowingly sell at less than the minimum price.26 A well recognized principle
of contract law is illustrated in that when one rides in a taxicab he has
agreed to pay the fare. He does not have to promise or agree to pay in words.
His actions in entering and riding in the cab bind him to the contract. A
common occurrence in many households is the arrival of unsolicited mer-
chandise accompanied by a price list. We know that if the recipient uses
20 Seagram-Distillers Corp. v. Old Dearborn Distrib. Co., 363 Iln. 610, 612, 2
N.E.2d 940, 941 (1936).
21 Standard Drug Co. v. General Elec. Co., 202 Va. 367, 374, 117 S.E.2d 289,
295 (1960).
22 Ohio Const. Art. IV, § 2 (1912):
• ..No law shall be held unconstitutional and void by the supreme court
without the concurrence of at least all but one of the judges, except in the
affirmance of a judgment of the court of appeals declaring a law unconstitu-
tional and void . ...
23 Defined note 13 supra.
24 Defined note 10 supra.
25 Defined note 8 supra.
26 Statute cited note 2 supra.
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the merchandise he is obligated to pay the price listed. Once again he is
bound by his actions and not by his words. Indeed this "new" concept
appears to be merely a statutory definition and application of a relatively
old common law concept heretofore known as a contract implied in fact.
An interesting comment upon this new concept is to be found in the
exhaustive opinion of Judge Leach of Franklin County in a case arising
under the 1959 act.27 In declaring the new act unconstitutional he observed:
[T]he assertion that the two acts may be constitutionally dis-
tinguished on the basis that under the 1959 Act the defendant has
"agreed" thereto, is to say that even though a General Assembly
cannot constitutionally regulate a course of conduct by certain
means (as held in Union Carbide), such constitutional limitations
have no application where the General Assembly provides that a
certain act of the party sought to be regulated shall constitute an
agreement to be so regulated. Under such a philosophy, there is
scarcely any constitutional principle which could not thus be
voided.28 (Emphasis added.)
The other new concept in the 1959 act is found, according to the
prevailing minority, in section 1333.31 which states that a proprietor retains
a proprietory interest in his commodity even after he has sold it because of
"his interest in protecting the good will associated with his trade-mark
or trade name." This concept is at least as old as fair trade itself, as indi-
cated in Old Dearborn where the Supreme Court said "the ownership of
the good will... remains unchanged notwithstanding the commodity has been
parted with. 2 9
In addition to the principal case, two other reported cases arose under
the new act. The Bulova Watch Co. case in Franklin County which declared
the act unconstitutional has already been referred to. The third case arose
in Hamilton County where a proprietor sought an injunction to restrain
a price cutting retailer.30 The Hamilton County court, after noting the
legislative attempt to overcome the constitutional objections raised by the
Bargain Fair case, stated that section 1333.28 which defines proprietor is
clearly violative of the Ohio Constitution3 ' in that it delegates legislative
authority to private persons. Pending further litigation in each appeals
district the minority decision of the supreme court in the instant case
forebodes a morass in the application of the new fair trade act as the act
may be enforced in some districts and ignored in others. This is so because
there is some authority for the proposition that a minority decision in the
27 Bulova Watch v. Ontario Stores, 176 NYE.2d 527, 86 Ohio L. Abs. 585 (C.P.
1961).
28 Id., 176 N.E.2d 527, 534, 86 Ohio L. Abs. 585, 597.
29 Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., supra note 17, at 195.
30 Helena Rubenstein v. Cincinnati Vitamin Distrib., 167 N.E.2d 687, 84 Ohio L.
Abs. 143 (C.P. 1960).
31 Ohio Const. Art. II, § 1 (1912): "The legislative power of the state shall be
vested in a general assembly . .. ."
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Ohio Supreme Court is no more binding on lower courts than a tie decision
in the United States Supreme Court.32
Both the new and old fair trade statutes are couched in terms of pro-
tecting the manufacturer's property interest in his good will and trade-mark.
It is interesting to note, however, that "retail dealer associations rather than
manufacturers have been the outstanding protagonists of fair trade legisla-
tion." 33 The Oregon Supreme Court stated the matter succinctly when it said
the "protection of the good will of the trade-mark owner is simply an excuse
and not a reason for the law." 34 The fair trade acts protect this good will
of the manufacturer on the basis of contract law, the newer type acts pro-
tecting it by what the Ohio Supreme Court calls an implied contract. How-
ever, "contracts or agreements convey the idea of a cooperative arrangement,
not a program whereby recalcitrants are dragged in by the heels and com-
pelled to submit to price fixing." 35
Many feel that the most cogent constitutional objection to fair trade
was to be found in that which concerns the delegation of legislative power to
private persons.36 The Ohio Supreme Court in the instant case disposes of
this objection in two short paragraphs3 7 by stating that it is not price fixing
as understood in the law when the producer of goods in free and open com-
petition with similar goods fixes only the price of his own commodity. Indeed
this is one of the types of price fixing which the anti-trust statutes were
designed to abolish. Therefore special legislation had to be drawn to exempt
fair trade agreements from the operation of the anti-trust acts, on both
the federal and state levels.38 In the face of this history the assertion that
it is not price fixing as understood in the law is incomprehensible. In this
connection the court says that free and open competition will prevent a
producer from overpricing his goods. This statement overlooks the common
"coincidence" that in most fair trade areas a giant size of any major brand
of tooth-paste, for example, is the same price as those which are in free and
open competition with it.3 9 Secondly, the court states that this is not legis-
lative price fixing, and by some process of logical legerdemain, this statement
is used as a reason which overcomes the objection of legislative delegation
to private persons. The court is correct that this is not legislative price fixing.
32 The ramifications of the minority decision in the instant case are examined in
Pogue, "Hudson Fair Trade Case-The Need for' Constitutional Amendment," 12 Clev.-
Mar. L. Rev. 513 (1963).
33 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Mkts. 109 F. Supp. 269,
270 (E.D. La. 1953), aff'd, 205 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1953).
34 General Elec. Co. v. Wahle, 207 Ore. 302, 317, 296 P.2d 635, 643 (1956).
35 Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 390 (1951).
36 See note, 27 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 333 (1958).
37 Hudson Distrib. Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 174 Ohio St. 487, 496 (1963).
38 See, e.g., Miller-Tydings Act 50 Stat. 693 (1937), 15 US.C. § 1 (1958). Ohio
Rev. Code § 1333.29(A) (1959): "It shall be lawful, anything in sections 1331.01 to
1331.14 of the Revised Code or otherwise provided in the Revised Code to the con-
trary notwithstanding . . .
39 Fulda, "Resale Price Maintenance," 21 Chi. L.R. 175, 198 (1954).
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It is price fixing by private individuals and thus is precisely what the court
found to be unconstitutional in Bargain Fair.
Ever since Munn v. Illinoi4° and the Minnesota Rate Cases4 1 it has
been accepted that rate making is a legitimate legislative function. Nebbia v.
New York 42 expanded this concept and said that price fixing on the retail
level is a legitimate function of the legislature and is not a violation of
federal due process. Then the question is: are fair trade laws a proper exer-
cise of the legislative function? We think not, because regardless of how
the statutes are drawn, their purpose is price fixing by private individuals.
The Oregon Supreme Court once again incisively digs into the heart of
the matter:
[T]he prices so fixed ... are to become the law of the state;
but if no agreement is entered into then there is to be no law. [It
takes an agreement between private persons to make the Fair Trade
Act operative.] This leaves wholly to persons outside the legislature
the power to determine whether there shall be a law. at all and, if
there is to be a law what the terms of that law shall be. It is im-
possible to conceive of a more complete delegation of legislative
power .... 43
This price fixing is determined not by the legislature itself nor by its legally
created agency, but by private individuals and as such is an unconstitutional
delegation-even abdication-of legislative power. This same rationale is
valid in any fair trade act case. It is strange indeed that the same court
which is so particular and stringent when denying legislative delegation
to administrative agencies44 in the absence of adequate standards and con-
trols will permit this same legislative delegation to private individuals
without requiring any standards or controls whatsoever, as it does in the
instant case.
40 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
41 230 U.S. 352 (1913).
291 U.S. 502 (1934).
43 Van Winkle v. Fred Meyers, Inc., 151 Ore. 455, 463, 49 P.2d 1140, 1143 (1935).
44 1 Ohio Jur. 2d, Administrative Law and Procedure §§ 25-28 (1953).
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